From start to finish, the kalam cosmological argument is predicated upon the A-Theory of time. On a B-Theory of time, the universe does not in fact come into being or become actual at the Big Bang; it just exists tenselessly as a four-dimensional space-time block that is finitely extended in the earlier than direction. If time is tenseless, then the universe never really comes into being, and, therefore, the quest for a cause of its coming into being is misconceived. [The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, pp. 183-184.]And....
We have good reasons for believing that a neo-Lorentzian theory is correct, namely that the existence of God in A-Theoretic time implies it. [From Craig's book "Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity"]
If you can't spot the circular reasoning a mile away, you can find something more entertaining to do by clicking here.
|I caught a fish this big, I swear!|
Gosh... who'da thunk it?[The] final part of the book seems to oscillate between two contrasting philosophical positions. According to the first, “relativity physics…is not necessarily saying anything that is relevant for the metaphysician” (p. 152), a claim that tends to be advanced whenever evidence coming from physics is against his metaphysical views. The second position is that physics “confirms” certain metaphysical and theological views over others, a claim that is put forth whenever evidence for the existence of a privileged frame (coming for instance from cosmic time or quantum non-locality) seems more reassuring. If this impression is well-founded, Craig’s book is essentially guided by an apologetic attempt and opportunistically uses physics and metaphysics for his purpose.
*Not to be confused with the phrase "More Doritos"