Craig's wrap-up of these purportedly awful objections begins with the objection that theists are guilty of special pleading.
Craig's right on one point – the Kalam's first premise clearly states that only "things that begin to exist" have a cause. But I feel that this betrays yet another critical weakness of the Kalam.
Let's say that I granted the entire argument. I ignored the equivocation, the question-begging, and the fallacy of composition and fully concurred with the argument as Craig has presented it. There is still absolutely zero independent justification for saying that the "first cause" must be supernatural, that it is eternal, or that it is some anthropomorphic deity.
Imagine, for example, that the universe is in an infinite state of expansion and contraction, as in Neil Turok's model. Because entropy only increases within the universe, time would essentially "reset" at every boundary condition. In other words, there would be no "absolute time" or "master time" over the expansion and contraction; time could still only be said to exist within the physical universe. The observable universe would still be finite into the past, have a beginning, have a cause, and yet there would be absolutely no kind of deity or "eternally existing cause" whatsoever.
I also think Craig's arguments are spurious regarding the nature of God. Craig has argued that God exists in "A-Theoretic" time, and that he exists eternally. Yet he also argues that a past-infinite is impossible. Why does he think, then, that a past-infinite is acceptable with regard to God? Sure as heck sounds like special pleading to me.
More on this in the next objection.
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